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This paper discusses the issue of perceptions and their influence on economic processes focusing
on corruption perception. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization is, the more probable
it is that a person dealing with that organization would offer a bribe, thus supporting corruption. Since
corruption perceptions are rarely based on actual experience, they might describe reality inadequately.
In this case the sources of corruption perceptions might facilitate or diminish the actual corruption
level. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and
the willingness to give bribes as well as the influence of different sources of corruption on corruption
perception in Ukraine.
Abstrakt
ČlÆnek se zab￿vÆ problematikou vn￿mÆn￿ korupce a jeho vlivu na ekonomickØ procesy. Vn￿mÆn￿
korupce je zř￿dkakdy zalo￿eno na osobn￿ch zku￿enostech a proto nemus￿ odpov￿dat realitě. Č￿m v￿ce si
v￿ak lidØ mysl￿ o určitØ organizaci, ￿e je zkorumpovanÆ, t￿m pravděpodobněj￿￿ je, ￿e nab￿dnou œplatek
a naopak. Zdroje informac￿ o korupci, kterØ formuj￿ vn￿mÆn￿ korupce, tak mohou k rozvoji korupce jak
přisp￿vat, tak ho brzdit. ČlÆnek analyzuje průzkum veřejnØho m￿něn￿ na Ukrajině za œčelem zji￿těn￿
vlivu různ￿ch zdrojů informac￿ o korupci na vn￿mÆn￿ korupce a souvislosti mezi vn￿mÆn￿m korupce a
ochotou dÆt œplatek.
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Introduction
Many factors that facilitate corruption are discussed in economic literature. Scholars often
mention the lack of adequate legislation, poor law enforcement, cultural prerequisites, the lack
of incentive for the government to fight corruption, low wages for state officials, etc. (see
Mauro, 1996, Tanzi, 1998, Rose-Ackerman 1997, Hofstede, 1991, Andvig, 1991). One thing
is often forgotten, or, at least, not articulated clearly enough: corruption might be influenced
by the perception of corruption. Perception itself is the product of the sources of information
about corruption, and may describe the level of corruption inadequately. This paper provides
an empirical analysis of the influence of the sources of information about corruption on
corruption perceptions and the association between perceptions and the willingness of people
to give bribes in Ukraine.
Corruption perceptions may substantially influence the level of corruption. In some cases
corruption perceptions can reinforce corruption. High corruption perceptions make people
believe that they have to pay bribes, and the officials to think that there is nothing wrong with
accepting them. Perceiving that many people pay bribes, customers are much more sure that a
bribe will be accepted and much less sure that a matter may be solved without a bribe.
Believing that everybody takes bribes, officials lose the fear of being punished for receiving
bribes. If each person believes everybody else to be corrupt, corruption becomes a part of the
culture: customers think that they will offend officials by not offering a bribe, and officials
who do not accept bribes are seen as cultural outliers. On the other hand, corruption
perceptions can also diminish corruption. In countries with strong law enforcement,
corruption perceptions work as a signal that switches on the law enforcing machine, which
eventually limits corruption. Such a path of events is, however, contingent on several factors.
The first is the availability of resources to fight corruption. If corruption is widespread, the
police are more likely to encounter a lack of resources to investigate every act of corruption.
The second is the actual, as opposed to the pretended, willingness to fight corruption. If2
corruption becomes a part of the culture, it is very difficult to eliminate it even if the best
legislation is in place and there is sufficient perception that people are corrupt.
Corruption perceptions might substantially influence the level of corruption, but where do
the perceptions come from? Obviously, once having paid a bribe, a customer will be surer that
the officials are corrupt. Similarly, once having accepted a bribe, the officials are more certain
that the organization is corrupt. Corruption perceptions, thus, are a product of corruption
itself. The problem is that corruption is not the only factor that determines the perceptions.
People learn about corruption from different sources. One of the most reliable is the actual
experience of corruption. However, actual contacts between officials and the public are quite
rare. Thus, few people can rely on personal experience. People speak about corruption with
other people or they hear about corruption through mass media (for the proportion of
respondents who use different sources of information about corruption, see Table 1). The
information gained in these ways might be incomplete, politically colored or subjectively
described. Looking for a big story or being paid by politicians, journalists may tend to
exaggerate stories about corruption. For the same reasons, publishers may choose to publish
proportionally more articles on corruption than the phenomenon deserves. However, in fear of
being punished for uncovering the acts or actual level of corruption, the mass media may also
avoid publishing materials on corruption. So, opinions on corruption formed by the mass
media may be far from reality. Similarly, information about corruption learned from friends or
strangers is also subjective. It is invariably affected by the temperament of the teller and,
possibly, his/her imagination.
Corruption perceptions are a very complex phenomenon, which may substantially
influence the level of corruption. This paper provides an econometric study of corruption
perceptions, how they are formed, and their influence on the willingness of the population to
give bribes in Ukraine.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief literature3
review of the theoretical studies about the role of perceptions in different sectors of an
economy, and, in particular, on the influence of the perception on the spread of corruption.
The second section describes the data. I use the data collected in a survey performed by the
Kiev International Institute of Sociology in 1998.  The third section describes the
methodology for the empirical analysis. The fourth section presents the results. The fifth
section concludes.
1. Do perceptions matter? A short literature survey
The role of beliefs and perceptions influencing economic processes is recognized in
many fields of economics. Krugman (1991) discusses the role of expectations in determining
the equilibrium in a simple model of international trade. Matsuyama (1991) shows that self-
fulfilling prophecies are an important determinant of the equilibrium in a model of
industrialization. Farrell and Saloner (1986) demonstrate that self-fulfilling prophecies can
influence the equilibrium in a model of technology adoption. In the field of macroeconomics,
expectations are important especially in search models, where the profitability of participating
in economic activities depends on how many other agents participate (see Diamond and
Fudenberg, 1978, and Howitt and McAfee, 1988).
In all the above studies several eqiuilibria are possible. The choice of equilibrium
depends substantially on the agents￿ expectations and history. The main idea can be most
easily described by a model proposed by Krugman (1991). In his setting there are two
countries opening up trade and two goods produced:  a constant returns to scale (CRS) good
and an increasing returns to scale (IRS) good. The assumptions are such that if many people
work in the CRS sector, the advantages of the IRS sector are not realized and it is more
profitable to work in the CRS sector. If more than a certain number of people switch to the
IRS sector, it starts to be more profitable to work there because of increasing returns to scale.4
Before trade is opened both goods are produced in both countries. When the countries start to
trade, natural specialization occurs. Which good will be produced in which country depends
on the comparative advantage in its production, which in its turn, depends on how many
people work there. In this situation if one expects that the rest of the population will choose to
work in the IRS sector, it is profitable for him/her to switch to this sector (contingent on the
prevalent production of the other country). If, on the other hand, everybody expects that
others will stay working in the CRS sector, it would be more profitable for them to stay in that
sector as well. The dynamics of the transition from one sector to another depends on both
expectations and the history of employment before trade was open
1.
A similar line of argument is employed in multiple equilibria models of corruption. To
my knowledge, the most general model in this field was proposed by Schelling (1973). In his
paper a population of state officials decides whether to accept bribes or to stay honest,
depending on the utility they gain.  Schelling plots the utilities of corrupt and honest officials
as a function of how many of other officials are corrupt. He argues that the utility of an honest
official decreases with an increase in the number of corrupt officials. The decline is attributed
to the dangerous effect of corruption on the economy as a whole. The utility of a corrupt
official is bell-shaped: it increases with the number of corrupt officials when relatively few
officials are corrupt, reaches its maximum and starts decreasing when the number of corrupt
officials exceeds a certain point. When only a few officials are corrupt, as the number of
people accepting bribes increases, the feeling of guilt from corruption, fear of loss of
reputation, and fear of actual punishment decrease (for similar argumentation see also
Akerlof, 1980) and the actual utility is larger. When the number of corrupt officials reaches a
                                                
1 All the articles mentioned above do not explicitly model the sources of beliefs and the paths of their changes.
More detailed analyses of these issues are proposed in game theory which utilizes a Bayesian updating
mechanism or in more modern fields of economics such as case￿based decision making (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1995) or evolutionary game theory.5
certain point the utility of one corrupt official starts decreasing, because corruption becomes a
less scarce good and bribers are willing to pay them less.
Another important assumption of Schelling￿s model is that the utility of an honest
official is greater than the utility of a corrupt official if few officials are corrupt, and less if
almost all the officials are corrupt. Under these assumptions three equilibria are possible:
there is no corruption (if all officials are honest it does not pay to become corrupt), all of the
officials are corrupt (if all the officials are corrupt it does not pay to become honest), or ￿ the
equilibrium in between ￿ some of the officials are corrupt, the others are not and the utility
of both corrupt and non-corrupt officials are equal. The last equilibrium is unstable: a small
external shock to perceptions of corruption may put the economy into a basin of attraction to
one of the other two equilibria. In this model, which equilibrium is chosen depends
substantially on the beliefs of officials about the corruptness of others. Schelling did not
provide explicit dynamic computations of the transitory paths.
A more specific dynamic model of corruption was developed by Lui (1986) who used
the overlapping generations framework and under certain assumptions calculated the expected
profitability of corruption for both the old and the young generation. The mathematics and
arguments of the paper are too complicated to be discussed here in detail. It is enough to say
that in this model at least two stationary states are possible: a more or a less corrupt one. For
the given preferences of the agents, the regulatory environment, and law enforcement, two
very different levels of corruption are possible.
Lui (1986) did not work explicitly with one￿s beliefs about the corruptness of others
and did not provide an explanation why one equilibrium is chosen rather than the other.
Beliefs were incorporated into the overlapping generations framework by Sah (1987). Sah
assumed that bureaucrats and citizens start with a subjective probability distribution about
how likely it is that the agent they will meet in a transaction is corrupt. Depending on the
distribution they calculate how profitable it is to engage in corrupt and non-corrupt6
transactions. After each period the beliefs are updated according to the Bayesian rule.
Similarly to Lui, Sah showed that several steady state levels of corruption are possible,
depending on the initial subjective probability of meeting a corrupt official, i.e. corruption
perception. The important feature of Sah￿s model is that it allows one to discuss discrepancies
between corruption perceptions and actual corruption occurrence, their impact on the
dynamics of the model and the equilibrium chosen.
This paper can be viewed as an empirical parallel to Sah￿s paper. Here I also analyze
the discrepancy between beliefs about the corruption of the state officials and the actual level
of corruption. Further, similar to Sah, I look at the influence of beliefs on the willingness of
the citizens to initiate corrupt acts.
2. The data
Data were collected by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in a survey named
￿Questions on National Integrity￿ in 1998. In this survey 2600 respondents from most of the
regions of Ukraine were asked to assess the level of corruptness of state and non-state
institutions, to reveal their opinions on the effectiveness of some methods and means to fight
corruption, the sources of the information about corruption and the reliability of the sources.
The respondents were chosen in a purely random fashion so that all adult citizens had an
equal chance to be interviewed
2. 475 respondents, i.e. 19% of intended sample, refused to be
                                                
2 The selection of respondents was done in several stages. First, towns and villages were chosen at random so
that the probability of inclusion of a village or town into the survey is proportional to the number of residents in
the village or town.  Then according to the same principle post offices, streets, buildings and, finally, the
respondents were chosen. The interviewers then informed the potential respondents about the survey and visited
them at their homes. It was not permitted to replace the respondent who denied to be interviewed with somebody
else.7
interviewed. The most frequent problem was that the respondents did not open the doors of
their homes to the interviewers. Other potential respondents opened their doors but refused to
answer the questions. The resulting size of the sample is 2104 respondents. The resulting
sample is 20% smaller than intended.
In order to find out whether the sample is still representative under these conditions,
the Kiev International Institute of Sociology compared the gender, age and education of the
resulting sample to the results of a demographic survey of the Ukrainian population done in
1989 (more contemporary data are not reliable since they are based on estimates). In none of
these categories did the error exceed 5% (Questions of National Integrity, 1998). The sample
can thus be considered representative.
The data I use in this paper are a part of the whole survey dataset. In particular I use
the following:
•   respondents￿ corruption perceptions in seventeen different institutions (for the
list of institutions see Table 2),
•   the number of respondents￿ visits to these institutions during the twelve months
before the survey,
•   the source of respondents￿ information about corruption (press, TV, radio,
friends, strangers, and personal experience),
•   the degree of the respondents￿ trust of the mass media,
•   respondents￿ opinion on how well the government fights corruption,
•   respondents￿ willingness to give bribes,
•   occupation, age and gender of the respondents, and
•   the size of respondents￿ town of residence.8
Respondents￿ corruption perception and the number of visits to the institutions are the
only institution-specific variables present in the analysis. For a brief description of all the data
variables see Table 3. For the wordings of the questions see Appendix 3.
3. Specification
This section is organised as follows. The first two subsections provide theoretical
argumentation for the choice of explanatory variables for the two equations I estimate: the
corruption perception equation and willingness￿to￿give￿bribe equation. The third subsection
discusses data problems and data transformations. The forth subsection is devoted to the
method of estimation.
3.1. Willingness–to–give–bribe–equation
The decision on whether to give bribes depends on the expected benefits from the
bribery net of possible losses
3.  Mathematically speaking,
WGB= F (p× Ben ￿q× Pun ) (1)
where
WGB  is the willingness to give bribe,
F  is an increasing function,
p  is the  perceived probability that the bribe is accepted,
Ben  is the expected benefits if the bribe is accepted (including the probability that
the benefits are indeed realized),
Pun  is the degree of punishment for corruption, and
                                                
3 I abstract here from the losses of effort employed when offering bribes.9
q  is the probability that the punishment is implemented
4.
The perceived probability that a bribe is accepted in a certain institution may be well
represented by the perception of corruption in the institution
5. If one perceives an institution
to be very corrupt, one is much more prepared to give a bribe even if one does not require any
illegal operations, and that the bribe will be accepted for the unofficial procedure in return. I
use corruption perception as a proxy for the perceived probability that the bribe would be
accepted or required.
The benefits from corruption are different in nature as well as extent in different
institutions. The benefits from corruption in, for example, tax inspection, are completely
different than those at schools or medical establishments. Sometimes, it is impossible to find
the monetary approximation of some benefits such as additional doctor care, which may save
the patient￿s life. In order to address this non-homogeneity of benefits, I conduct an analysis
for different institutions separately rather than aggregating the data across institutions.
The perceived possible punishment if the bribe is not accepted may be of two kinds:
legislative and social. The legislative type of punishment, together with the probability that it
is implemented, is proxied by the perceived inaction of the government in fighting
corruption
6. Social punishment represents the possible resentment of neighbors toward corrupt
                                                
4 Theoretically one should distinguish between two possible probabilities of punishment depending on whether
the official accepts or rejects the bribe. However, in the case of Ukraine both of these probabilities are very low,
thus, one can assume them to be equal and the formula above makes sense.
5 Here I leave out the problem of facing one official many times and deriving the relevant corruption perception
from the interactions with a certain official rather than the whole institution. The data allow me to do so since the
number of visits to the institutions in question is often rather small, and thus the probability that the respondents
would rely on their experience with one particular official is small as well.
6 Note that the question in the questionnaire about the willingness of the government to fight corruption is
formulated in a way that addresses the actual deeds of the government rather than legislative acts that are never10
behavior. It substantially depends on whether corruption is perceived to be an evil in the
population, and on the particular sub-culture present in the population group (see peasant
example below). In any case, a major prerequisite for social punishment is the extent to which
people in a community know each other. In the big city, where people do not know each other
very much, social punishment is virtually impossible: one does not care about antipathy of the
person one does not know well. Thus, expected punishment is proxied by both the perceived
willingness of the government to fight corruption and, partially, the size of the town the
respondent lives in.
When estimating the relationship above I also control for the individual characteristics
of respondents, namely occupation, size of the respondent￿s town of residence, age and
gender
7. Below I briefly explain why I consider these characteristics important.
Occupation influences cultural environment of the respondent and his/her attitude to
corruption. While the influence of the attitude to corruption on the willingness to give bribes
is quite obvious, I will focus more on culture issues. Take for example peasants. It is well
established in the anthropological literature that peasants usually have their own culture,
which distinguishes them from people of other occupations. According to Harrison (1985),
peasants are usually people who believe that everything in this world is of the limited
quantities: the land they work on cannot be increased, and they are not able to collect more
than a certain amount of harvest per year. The only way they can make themselves better off
is to try to take a bigger part from the constant social cake. One can argue that having such a
psychological background they perceive the corruption of the state officials as an opportunity
to get more from the cake.
                                                                                                                                                        
enforced.
7 One can argue that education of the respondents should be included too. On the other hand the impact of
education is already partially included through age and occupations of the respondents so I decided to leave
education out so that it can be used in correction equations (see correction equations section).11
Occupation may be also interconnected with the profitability of corruption, and the
frequency of facing it, which in turn affects the willingness to give bribes. Businessmen, for
example, are much more likely to give bribes. They have to communicate with state officials
much more often than the rest of the population and usually have limited time to solve
problems. Businessmen are also the people for whom bribery is the most profitable.
Another factor I control for is the size of the respondents￿ towns of residence. For
example for businessmen it makes a great difference if a bribe is given in a small town for the
monopolistic position on the small local market than to bribe the state official in a big city for
a substantial share of national market.
Restating the above verbal arguments algebraically, one arrives at the following
relationship:
B = f 1(Ci, I, T, O, A, G) + e1 (2)
Where
Dependent variable: perceived necessity to pay bribe (B)
Independent variables:
corruption perception in institution i (Ci)
perceived inactiveness of the government in fighting corruption (I)
size of the respondent￿s town of residence (T)
occupational dummies (O)
respondent￿s age (A) and gender (G)
3.2 Corruption perception equation12
Perception of corruption, as any other kind of perception, is very much influenced by
two factors. The first is the information one receives about the phenomenon. The second is the
way the individual processes the information and makes conclusions.  The information
received may be intentionally or unintentionally biased by the source of information. The way
the individual processes the information substantially depends on his/her individual
characteristics. Below I discuss both of the factors in relation to corruption perception and
form corruption perception equations.
The most reliable source of information that influences one￿s perception of corruption
in a certain institution is the actual experience when dealing with the officials from the
relevant institution. Here a person may face blatant demand of bribe, intentional slowing
down bureaucratic procedures in a hope for a bribe, or, to the contrary, smooth and easy
administering of his/her request. Thus, one could argue that the more a person visits certain
institution, the more accurate his/her perception of corruption in this institution becomes.
While frequency of visits is very important determinant of corruption perception, in
some cases it may be misleading. The respondent might have to go to the institution many
times just because he/she had a misfortune to meet a corrupt official (who slowed down the
bureaucratic procedures in order to be able to ask for a bribe) the first time he/she went there.
Yet, there are very few people in the sample who have visited the institutions more than one
time during a year before a survey, so I can exclude the last possibility from the analysis.
Unfortunately, few people go to state institutions often enough to be able to form their
perception of corruption solely on their personal experience. People learn about corruption in
many ways. They read stories about it in press, listen to the stories on radio, watch TV
programs. They share the information with their friends, relatives, or strangers on the streets
(for the proportions of the respondents that use the different sources of information about
corruption see table 1). All of these sources are likely to provide colored information about
corruption.13
The most controversial source of information about corruption are the mass media. It
may want to suppress the issue of corruption in a fear of being punished by the relevant state
officials. It may publish politically colored articles on corruption. Or, it may publish more
articles on corruption than the phenomenon deserves just in order to publish big stories and,
thus, increase its audience. Sometimes, the audience can distinguish between these kinds of
articles, but often not. In any case, the influence of the mass media on a person￿s corruption
perception depends on the extent of his/her trust in the mass media.
The other sources of information are friends, relatives and strangers. While the extent
of trust might be also important here, the contacts between the giver and the receiver of
information are closer than in the case of the mass media and, except strangers, one can better
estimate trustfulness of the information.
Besides sources of information the individual characteristics of the respondents such
as age, gender and occupation might be important determinants of one￿s perception of
corruption. People of very old or young age might not be much interested corruption since
they have more important things to care about. In addition, they are likely not to face
corruption as often as the population of working age. Thus, their perception of corruption is
likely to be much more vague and unclear.
Men and women might perceive corruption differently since they have different roles
in the society. Women, who care for children and, thus, have to visit schools and universities
often might have a different perception of corruption than men, who know about it only from
TV program (usually he has much more time to watch them), and press.
People who hold intellectually demanding positions are more likely to exercise critical
thinking and develop their own opinion on corruption, rather than absorbing the opinion of the
people with whom they frequently communicate with, or of the producers of TV and radio
programs. In addition, an occupation, which imposes the need for more frequent contacts with14
officials grant him/her a more realistic corruption perception than that of his/her fellows
whose contacts with red tape are scarce.
Another important factor that influences corruption perception is education. I
intentionally leave it out from this equation since the effect of education is already absorbed
by age and occupation.
Further on, one￿s corruption perception is influenced by the size of one￿s town of
residence. There are many factors, which facilitate the spread of corruption, which is likely to
be reflected in corruption perceptions, in large cities. Some of these are listed below:
•   In large cities there are more bureaucratic positions since the cities serve as
administrative centers for the regions. There is also more police and more
hospitals.
•   Bureaucrats of large towns usually decide about larger sums of money.
•   In large cities there are more opportunities to spend money, and there are more
advertisements. Thus, the pressure for impulse buying is stronger, and more
money is necessary.
•   People living is large cities are less likely to have private gardens. In the
extreme case when the officials are not paid salary for longer time, which has
happened in Ukraine, they are much more dependent on bribes in the large
cities.
•   In Ukraine officials of the big cities are much more likely to meet rich
customers since big cities are usually the centres of business activity.
•   Large cities are also the centres of political life.
•   In the large cities information is spread more easily. People read more
newspapers, since there are more newspapers available. There are usually more
TV and radio channels, better access to the internet.15
On the other hand, as it was already discussed in the previous section, in large towns
people do not know each other that well. Thus it is almost impossible in the large cities to
exercise effectively the mechanisms of social punishment. The impact of lack of information
about fellow neighbors on corruption and corruption perceptions depends on the set of values
of town communities.  If corruption is perceived negatively, the ability of the small towns to
socially punish wrongdoers might lead to less corruption, which is then reflected in lower
corruption perceived. If, on the other hand corruption is seen as a norm, those who are not
corrupt may be seen as social outliers, and the mechanisms of social punishment may lead to
more corruption.
In the light of the above arguments, one arrives at the following relationship
Ci = f2 (Fi, S, T, O, A, G) + e2 (3)
Where
Dependent variable: corruption perception in institution i (Ci)
Independent variables:
Frequency of contacts to institution i (Fi)
Source of information about corruption (S)
The size of the respondent￿s town of residence (T)
Occupational dummies (O)
Respondent￿s age (A) and gender (G)
4. Data problems and data transformations16
As it is explained in the data section corruption perception and number of contacts to
the institutions are institution specific, whereas willingness to give a bribe is not. The question
arises whether to construct one general corruption perception out of the seventeen institution
specific corruption perceptions or run the model above for each institution separately, or to
combine these two approaches and pool together some of the institutions￿ corruption
perceptions.  None of the proposed approaches is perfect. If one constructs a single corruption
perception variable one most certainly runs the risk of imperfectly choosing the procedure of
aggregation (the institutions are very different and it is difficult to choose weights each
institution should have in the aggregate outcome) and looses information. In addition, one
cannot address the different types of the benefits from corruption in different institutions. On
the other hand, if one runs seventeen different analyses, one is in the danger to misinterpret
the coefficients, since willingness to give bribe, which might be determined by experiences in
one institution, might be attributed to another. The best seems to be the middle path: pool
together the institutions that belong to one category and leave separate the others.
There is one more reason for pooling some of the institutions together: that is missing
values and sampling zeroes in the institutions specific variables. There are only two variables
that capture institution specificities:  corruption perception and number of contacts to the
institution. These variables are the most important to distinguish one institution from the
other. Unfortunately, there are very few respondents who actually visited some of institutions.
There are even fewer respondents who both visited the institutions and reveal their corruption
perception (see table 2). The contingency tables look still worse: in many cases there is no
observations in the cells of frequent visitors with lower corruption perceptions, or the few
respondents who visited the institutions the most often distributed their corruption perception
in very chaotic manner. The lack of observations and lots of zeroes in contingency tables
make the potential results very unreliable. The solution is to pool together some institutions.
For example ministries, presidential administration and parliament I pooled to the central17
government group. There are eleven resulting institutions. For the description which original
institutions are included to which resulting institution see the table 4.
For all the resulting institutions it is necessary co calculate resulting corruption
perception and frequency of visits. Three cases are to be distinguished depending on whether
the respondent provided his corruption perception (frequency of visits) for al the included
institutions, some of them, or none.
I.  If the respondent provided his/her corruption perception (or frequency of visits) in all the
organizations included, the rounded average was computed and used as his/her corruption
perception (or frequency of visits) for the resulting institution
II.  If the respondent did not provide his perception of corruption (frequency of visits) in some
of the institutions, average of the rest was computed and I assigned this number to his/her
perception of corruption (frequency of visits) in the resulting institution.
III.  If the respondent did not provide his perception of corruption (frequency of visits) in any
of the institutions, N/A was assigned to the resulting institution.
Unfortunately, even after the data transformation, contingency tables contained a lot of
zeros (for the number of responses in each of the contingency table column and the average
perceptions of corruption see table 5). The only other possibility to reduce the number of
zeroes was to diminish the number of the categories of frequency of visits variable. The cut
point I used was the requirement that contingency tables have in each cell not less than five
observations as it is the usual rule in the contingency table analysis (Agresti 1996). For the
resulting categories, means of corruption perception, and numbers of observations see Table
5.
Even after the data transformations suggested above were performed, the response
rates for corruption perception and number of visits to the relevant institutions in some cases18
were very low (around 50% of the sample for the state TV, see table 2.), and, thus, the
question arose whether those people who answered all the questions constitute a
representative sample. In order to avoid possible self-selection bias I use Heckman￿s
correction approach (Heckman, 1979): first I run correction equations, save Heckman￿s
lambda (inverse Mill￿s ratio) and include it in the right hand side of the main equations. For
the specification of correction equations and the discussion on the outcome of their estimation
see appendix 1.
4. The method of estimation
The resulting equations are the following
Main equations
B = Pr ( βb1 Const +  βb2 Ci + βb3 I + βb4 T + βb5 O + βb6 A + βb7 X + βb8  λb ) + e1 (4a)
Ci = Pr (βc1 Const +  βc2 Fi + βc3 S + βc4 T + βc5 O + βc6 A + βc7 X + βc8  λc ) + e2 (4b)
Correction equations:
DWGB =Pr (α10 Const +  α11  A + α12  A
2 + α13 E + α14  X) + e3 (5a)
DCP = Pr (α20 Const +  α21  A + α22  A
2 + α23 E + α24  X) + e4 (5b)
Where
Pr ￿ normal probability distribution
B - perceived necessity to pay bribe
Ci - corruption perception in institution i
Fi - frequency of contacts to institution i19
S - source of information about corruption
T - the size of the town where the respondent lives
O - occupational dummies
I - perceived inactiveness of the government in fighting corruption
DWGB - dummy equal to 0 if no value is missing in all the variables present in the Willingness
to Give Bribe equation, and 1 if at least one value is missing
DCP  - dummy equal to 0 if no value is missing in all the variables present in the Willingness




λb  and λc are inverse Mill￿s ratios coming from the correction equations
Where
Perceived necessity to give bribe is a categorical ordered variable that varies from one
(it is not necessary to give a bribe) to five (bribe is unavoidable). It is not institution specific.
Corruption perception in a certain institution was originally categorical ordered
variable that varied from one (very clean institution) into five (very corrupt institution). It is
institution specific. In the analysis the variable is split to five dummies. One of them is
omitted in order to avoid the dummy trap.
Town size was originally ordered categorical variable that varied from one (village) to
five (city with more than 500 000 of inhabitants). It is also split to a set of five dummies. The
dummy for the smallest village is omitted.
The frequency of contacts with institutions was originally a categorical ordered
variable that varied from one (never visited) to four (visited more than ten times during the20
last twelve months). It is institution specific. I split it into four dummies. The ￿never visited￿
dummy is omitted.
Sources of information about corruption include press, radio, television, friends,
relatives, and strangers. They are not institution specific. There are six dummies with one if
the respondent used this source and zero otherwise. In order to correct for the possible
disbelief to the mass media I multiplied the dummies for the mass media by categorical
variable representing ￿perceived trust to the media￿. The latter ranges from one (the
respondent totally trusts the mass media) to five (the respondent completely distrusts the mass
media). The resulting categorical variables for the means of mass media vary from zero (the
respondent does not learn about corruption from the mass media at all) through one (the
respondent learns about corruption, among other sources, from the mass media and
completely trusts the mass media) to five (the respondent learns about corruption, among
other sources, from the mass media but thinks that the information there is completely
untruthful). Each of the resulting categorical variables is then split into six dummies. I omit
the zero dummy (a person does not learn about corruption from this particular source of
information).
Age is a continuous variable.
Education was originally a categorical variable that varied from one to nine. I split
education variable into the set of nine dummies and left one of them out in order to avoid the
dummy trap.
Sex is represented by a dummy equal to one if the respondent is male and two if the
respondent is female.
The system of main equations is of triangular form (C is included to the first equation
but B is not included to the second), and, thus, the second equation might be consistently
estimated independently of the first but not vice versa. However, I might gain efficiency if I21
estimate both of the equations simultaneously. There are two types of correlations, which
make me to vote for simultaneous estimation. Firstly, similarly to the seemingly unrelated
regressions, the error terms of the equations are likely to be influenced by the same factors,
and, thus, might be correlated (in fact I did find a strong correlation of errors when I did the
estimates). The possible factors that may influence both of the errors are the specificity of
Ukrainian population, individual characteristics of the respondents, their definition of
corruption and attitude to it, possible fear to respond negatively to the questions about
corruption, etc. The second correlation is caused by the presence of the Corruption Perception
variable in the first equation.
Thus, technically, the estimation of the system above means estimation of two-
equation joint ordered probits (I use probits because it is much easier to model simultaneous
equations for this case than for logits). For the technical details of programming and
estimation see appendix 1.
5. Results
For the outcomes of the equation-by-equation analysis see tables 6. and 7. Note that
the willingness to give bribe equation is not estimated consistently (the consistent estimates
are obtained by simultaneous approach), therefore the results are different from those in tables
8 and 9 (simultaneous estimates). The outcomes of correction equations are presented in
appendix 1in the tables A1-1 and A1-2. For brief description of all the variables see table 3.
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the ￿town size four￿ dummy (town more than 200 000
of inhabitants and less than 500 000 of inhabitants) behaved differently than the rest of the
town size dummies: it is in most cases positive and significant, while the other coefficients are
negative. It seems to be quite difficult to explain this phenomenon (I will discuss the possible
explanations in the relevant section of the results interpretation). The results might be just22
spurious due to possible collinearity. In order to investigate this issue I regressed the town
size four dummy onto all other the variables present in the equations. The R
2, which came out
of these regressions, was around 0.3. It is somewhat small to blame multicollinearity, however
too large to claim independence. So, I excluded the dummy from the equations and run
simultaneous system once more. The results appeared somewhat different in some particular
institutions, but the overall pattern was consistent with the original estimates. The results of
the estimation without town size four dummy are available upon the request.
  The rest of this section is organized as follows. I start with presenting the main
results, proceed with supplementary results and finish with the outcomes of correction
equations.
5.1. Main results
Main results include answers to four questions. The first is whether willingness of the
population to give bribes is associated with corruption perception. The second is whether the
government is an important player in anti corruption game, i.e. whether its perceived
willingness to fight corruption is associated with the willingness of the population to give
bribes. The third is whether corruption perception of the general public is close to reality, i.e.
whether one￿s perception of corruption depends on the frequency of visits to the relevant
institution. The fourth is whether mass media has the power to influence corruption
perceptions of the population.
5.1.1. Is willingness to give bribes associated with corruption perception?
In both of the outcomes with and without town size four dummy corruption perception
is positively and significantly associated with the willingness to give bribe. Moreover, in both23
the outcomes (with and without town size four dummy) and in all the eleven cases the
relevant coefficients increase in value and significance with corruption perception: the more
corrupt the person perceives the institutions to be the more willing he/she is to give bribes.
5.1.2. Is perceived willingness of the government to fight corruption associated with the
willingness to give bribes?
As one can see from the outcome table there is almost no relationship. Obviously, the
government is not an important player in the anti-corruption struggle in Ukraine. 63% of the
respondents state that they agree or rather agree that the government does not do anything to
fight corruption. Only 8% of the respondents disagreed or rather disagreed with the statement
above.
5.1.3. Is frequency of visits to a particular institution significantly associated with
corruption perception?
In five cases out of eleven the relevant coefficients are significant at conventional
levels. In the cases of local government, juridical institutions and police the more one goes to
these institutions the more corrupt he/she perceives them to be. The same is true for the most
frequent visitors of medical establishments (more than ten times per year), while people who
visit them less often perceive them to be less corrupt. Inspections are also close to the point
when frequent visitors perceive them to be more corrupt: the relevant coefficient is at the edge
of significance in the analysis with town size four and is not significant without town size
four. Privatization authorities are perceived less corrupt if one goes there one or two times,
but more corrupt if he/she goes there more than two times per year.24
5.1.4.Are mass media influential in creating corruption perception?
To some extent yes. People who get information about corruption from press or
television tend to perceive state institutions to be less corrupt than the rest of the population
believes. On the other hand people who listen to the radio perceive some of the state
institutions to be more corrupt.
5.2. Supplementary results
This section describes the results, which do not fall to the core part of this paper, but
are also interesting. The first sub-section discusses how the information about corruption
obtained from friends, strangers and personal experience influences the perception of
corruption. The second subsection describes the effect of the respondent￿s town of residence.
The third one proceeds with the effect of occupation, age and gender. The forth subsection
comments on correction equations.
5.2.1. Friends, strangers and personal experience
  People who learn about corruption from friends tend to perceive most of the state
institutions to be less corrupt. The effect of strangers is not that uniform. People who learn
about corruption from strangers perceive juridical institutions and educational establishments
to be more corrupt, while they think that privatization authorities are less corrupt comparing
to the opinion of the rest of population.
Again, as it was expected, people who have the information about corruption from
personal experience perceive the institutions to be more corrupt.25
5.2.2. Town size
The respondents from towns sized two, three and five (small towns, bigger towns up to
200 000 of inhabitants and cities more than 500 000 of inhabitants) perceive state institutions
to be more corrupt, but they are less willing to give bribes. On the other hand the respondents
living in towns sized four (towns from 200 000 to 500 000 of inhabitants) tend to perceive
state institutions to be less corrupt, but they are more willing to give bribes.
Several arguments that support the idea that the bigger the town is the more corrupt
the state institutions are perceived were discussed in methodology section. The outcome from
the econometric analysis generally supports this suggestion: many town size dummies are
positive and significant. However, there is no trend similar to corruption perception ￿
willingness to give bribe relation, where the relevant coefficients increased with the
corruption dummies. Another surprising thing is that while many town size two, three and
five coefficients are positive in corruption perception equation, town size four coefficient is
negative and often significant. This outcome seems spurious. The only difference between the
towns sized four and the rest, besides the size, is that the towns sized four are usually small
administrative centres, while town sized five are very big administrative centres, and all the
other towns are not administrative centres at all. There are around fifteen of towns sized four,
which are situated all over Ukraine. So, it is very improbable that the difference in the results
was caused by some kind of regional pattern. It might be that towns sized four have a unique
culture, as for example peasants do. However, it is difficult to say now what is the difference
in the cultures and why it causes such a difference in the results. This seems to be the question
for sociologists.
In the case of willingness to give bribe equation the story is opposite to that of
corruption perception equation: people in towns sized two, three and five are less willing to26
give bribes given their corruption perception. In the towns sized four, residents are more
willing to give bribes, given their corruption perception.
The lower willingness to give bribes in the large towns may be explained by the fact
that the future benefits of the bribe in large towns are smaller. In big towns there are much
more state officials and the probability that one meets the same official the next time he/she
visits the institution is smaller than in small towns. Thus, when a person gives a bribe in the
small town, he might expect that when he/she sees the official for the next time, he/she will be
treated better since the official would expect to get bribe again. On the other hand, in bigger
towns, where people do not meet each other that often, the person can not expect better
treatment in the future for the bribe in present.
The remaining puzzle is the towns sized four problem: why they behave differently
from the other towns. I do not have a sufficient explanation for this puzzle. It may be caused
by small regional centres￿ culture, or it might be just spurious.
5.2.3. Occupation, age and gender
Few occupational dummies are significant. It is worth to mention only some.
Businessmen and peasants are more willing to give bribes. This finding is not surprising since
businessmen are those who can benefit from corruption much more than people of other
occupations.  Peasants are more willing to give bribes to the special peasants￿ culture, as it
was described in the methodology section. Unemployed perceive some state institutions to be
more corrupt, which may be contribute to their resentment to state in general.
Older people perceive state institutions to be more corrupt, but they are less willing to
give bribe as compared to younger part of population.   The effect of gender is unclear.
Women tend to perceive central and local governments and juridical institutions to be more27
corrupt, while privatization authorities to be less corrupt as compared to men￿ perception. In
the willingness to give bribe there is almost no difference.28
6. Conclusion
This paper presents empirical evidence that corruption perceptions are significantly
associated with the willingness of the population to give bribes in Ukraine. If one perceives an
institution to be very corrupt, he/she is more willing to pay a bribe there. This way corruption
perception may actually facilitate corruption.
Corruption perceptions, being partially a product of corruption itself, do not always
reflect reality properly. If one assumes that those people who visit the state institutions most
often have the most adequate perception of corruption, then from the econometric analysis
follows that the Ukrainian population tend to underestimate corruption in the local
government, juridical institutions, and police. On the other hand, Ukrainians tend to
overestimate corruption in banks. The last effect should, however, be taken with caution
because those people who visit these institutions most often use very limited set of services,
and, thus, may have clear perception of corruption only in the departments of these
institutions they visit.
Special attention should be paid to the mass media as the source of corruption
perceptions.  In the countries such as Ukraine, where corruption scandals very rarely lead to
legal accusations, the mass media might actually support corruption. If the media provides
people with corruption perceptions that are darker than the reality, it may make people to
believe that they have to give bribes. In the case of five institutions out of eleven (juridical
institutions, army, medical establishments, privatization authorities and banks) people who
learn about corruption from press perceive the institutions to be less corrupt. The same holds
in the case of two institutions for state TV (central government and privatization authorities).
While people who learn about corruption from radio perceive central government, medical
establishments and privatization authorities to be more corrupt.29
The other sources of information about corruption such as friends and personal
experience are much more influential. Friends are significant in seven to nine cases of
different institutions out of eleven depending on whether town sized four is included or not.
Personal experience is important in all the institutions. People who learn about corruption
from friends tend to perceive the institutions to be less corrupt, while people who learn about
corruption from personal experience perceive the institutions to be more corrupt. The last
finding is somewhat biased since personal experience with corruption provider worse
corruption perception from definition.
An interesting and extremely informative and important finding is that perceived
willingness of the government to fight corruption is never significantly associated with the
willingness of the population to give bribes. This might be a symptom of the population
totally ignoring its government lacking hope that it will ever help. This is a sign of the lack of
democracy in the country and prerequisite to the authoritarian regime in the future. Actually,
only a minor percentage of the respondents believe that the government is really doing
something to fight corruption.
The message of the whole paper is that corruption perceptions, as any kinds of
perceptions that are spread all over the population should be paid much more attention than it
was done before, as suggested in the literature review section. The perceptions might actually
facilitate the negative or positive processes that take place in society.30
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Table 1.
Sources of information about corruption the respondents use





Acquaintances and Friends 41,68
Strangers on Streets and in the Means of Transportation 15,73
Personal Experience 25,19
Difficult to Say/Do Not Know 3,71
Table 2.
List of institutions with the response rates for both corruption perception and the
frequency of visits
No Organizations
Response rates for both
corruption perceptions
and frequency of visits, %
1 Ministries and Other Central Executive
Bodies
73
2 Presidential Administration 65
3 Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) 73
4 Local Government 78
5 Public Prosecutor 70
6 Juridical System 72
7 Customs 69
8 Tax Inspection 71
9 State Auto Inspection 77
10 Local militia (police) 78
11 Army 65
12 Privatization Authorities 63
13 Banks 58
14 Secondary Education Institutions 76
15 Higher Education Institutions 78
16 State Medical Establishments 84
17 State Television 4934
Table 3
A brief description of the variables present in the correction and main equations
Variable Description Comments
Corruption Perception 1 The institution is not corrupt at all Omitted in order to avoid dummy trap
Corruption Perception 2 The institution is rather not corrupt
Corruption Perception 3 One can face corruptness of officials
in approximately as many cases as
non-corruptness there
Corruption Perception 4 The institution is rather corrupt
Corruption Perception 5 The institution is heavily corrupt
No fight 1 The respondent completely agrees that
the government does not do anything
to fight corruption Omitted
No fight 2 The respondent rather agrees that the
government does not do anything to
fight corruption
No fight 3 The government fight corruption in as
may cases as does not fight it
No fight 4 The respondent rather disagrees that
the government does not do anything
to fight corruption
No fight 5 The respondent completely disagrees
that the government does not do
anything to fight corruption
Town size 1 Village Omitted
Town size 2 Something in between village and the
small town
Town size 3 Town up to 200 000 of inhabitants
Town size 4 Town more than 200 000 but less than
500 000 of inhabitants
Town size 5 City more than 500 000 of inhabitants
Peasant Agriculture laborer
Worker worker outside of  the agriculture
Clerk Clerical without higher education
Specialist Specialist (higher education required)
Businessman Businessman or self employed
Retired Retired
Student Student or pupil
Homemaker Homemaker
Unemployed Unemployed looking for a job
Other Other occupation Omitted
Correction variable Inverse Mill￿s ration from the
corresponding  correction equation
Frequency of Visits=0  The respondent never visited the
institution in question during the 12
month before the survey Omitted
Frequency of Visits=1 Visited one or two times
Frequency of Visits=2 Visited more than two but less then
ten times
Frequency of Visits=3 Visited more than ten times
Press  =0 The respondent does not learn about
corruption from the press Omitted35
Press =1 Learns about corruption from the
press and trusts the mass media
entirely
Press  =2 Learns about corruption from the
press and thinks that the information
about corruption in the mass media is
in most cases truthful
Press  =3 Learns about corruption from the
press and thinks that it is difficult to
say whether the information about
corruption published in the mass
media is truthful
Press  =4 Learns about corruption from the
press and believes that the information
about corruption in the mass media is
often untruthful
Press  =5 Learns about corruption from the
press and believes that the information
about corruption in the mass media is
always untruthful
TV=0 The respondent does not learn about
corruption from television Omitted
TV=1 Learns about corruption from
television and trusts the mass media
entirely
TV=2 Learns about corruption from
television and thinks that the
information about corruption in the
mass media is in most cases truthful
TV=3 Learns about corruption from
television and thinks that it is difficult
to say whether the information about
corruption published in the mass
media is truthful
TV=4 Learns about corruption from
television and believes that the
information about corruption in the
mass media is often untruthful
TV=5 Learns about corruption from
television and believes that the
information about corruption in the
mass media is always untruthful
Radio=0 The respondent does not learn about
corruption from radio Omitted
Radio=1 Learns about corruption from radio
and trusts the mass media entirely
Radio=2 Learns about corruption from radio
and thinks that the information about
corruption in the mass media is in
most cases truthful
Radio=3 Learns about corruption from radio
and thinks that it is difficult to say
whether the information about
corruption published in the mass
media is truthful
Radio=4 Learns about corruption from radio
and believes that the information
about corruption in the mass media is
often untruthful
Radio=5 Learns about corruption from radio
and believes that the information36
about corruption in the mass media is
always untruthful
Friends Learns about corruption from friends
and relatives
Strangers Learns about corruption from
strangers
Experience Learns about corruption from personal
experience
Age Age of the respondent
Age square Squared age of the respondent
Education 1 Less than 4 years of school Omitted
Education 2 More than 4 years and less than 7
Education 3 More than 7 years and less than 10
Education 4 Specialized school after 7-8 years
Education  5 Full secondary education (10-11
years)
Education 6 Specialized after 10-11 years
Education 7 Full secondary specialized education
Education 8 More than 3 years of higher education,
but not full higher ed.
Education 9 Full higher education
Gender 1 ￿ male, 2 - female
 Table 4.
Resulting institutions and the response rates
No Name Institutions included Response rate, %
1 Central Government Ministries, Presidential Administration,
Parliament
73
2 Local Government Local Government 78
3 Juridical System Courts and Prosecutors 75
4 Inspections Customs and Tax Police 76
5 Police Auto Inspection and Police (militia) 82
6 Army Army 65
7 Educational Establishments Schools and Universities 82
8 Medical Establishments Medical Establishments 84
9 State Television State Television 49
10 Privatization Authorities Privatization Authorities 63
11 Banks Banks 5837
Table 5.
Mean perception of the level of corruption in the institutions depending on the number




















Central Mean 4.154 . 3 2 N / A N / A
Government N 1502 28 N/A N/A
Local Mean 4.124 . 0 6 4 . 18N / A
Government N 1220 310 130 N/A
Juridical Mean 4.09 4.25 N/A N/A
Institutions N 1440 141 N/A N/A
Inspections Mean 4.28 4.36 N/A N/A
N 1267 335 N/A N/A
Police Mean 4.39 4.57 N/A N/A
N 1300 420 N/A N/A
Army Mean 3.54 3.67 N/A N/A
N 1311 57 N/A N/A
Educational Mean 3.90 3.84 3.91 N/A
Establishments N 1275 276 182 N/A
Medical Mean 4.25 4.154 . 174 . 4 1
Establishments N 737 450 364 222
State TV Mean 3.31 3.60 N/A N/A
N 1032 15N / A N / A
Privatization Mean 3.85 3.47 3.82 N/A
authorities N 1114 196 22 N/A
Banks Mean 3.65 3.22 3.29 3.12
N 1090 72 35 26
                                                
8 Mean in the mean corruption perception and N is the number of observations in each cell.38


















Constant 0.35 0.130 . 190 . 0 4- 0 . 0 1 0.26 0.17 0.20 -0.26 0.38 0.10
[.334] [.646] [.523] [.914] [.990] [.353] [.532] [.484] [.487] [.203] [.744]
Corruption -0.170 . 2 20 . 19 0.30 0.21 0.33
a 0.31
c 0.21 -0.06 0.14 0.43
a
Perception 2 [.554] [.273] [.340] [.294] [.546] [.006] [.094] [.303] [.641] [.369] [.001]
Corruption 0.13 0.37























Perception 5 [.723] [.021] [.071] [.040] [.068] [.173] [.014] [.013] [.095] [.968] [.869]
No fight 2
9 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.05
[.447] [.561] [.276] [.228] [.390] [.761] [.756] [.522] [.860] [.672] [.568]
No fight 3 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.07
[.919] [.921][ . 5 8 1][ . 4 6 1] [.657] [.808] [.885] [.867] [.897] [.986] [.375]
No fight 4 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.21
[.742] [.442] [.886] [.827] [.752] [.473] [.512] [.771] [.844] [.693] [.121]
No fight 5 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.18- 0 . 19
[.952] [.913] [.639] [.662] [.693] [.877] [.676] [.576] [.574] [.325] [.306]
Town size 2 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.05
[.573] [.568] [.522] [.476] [.540] [.175] [.410] [.418] [.937] [.799] [.686]
Town size 3 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.01 0.12
[.694] [.984] [.992] [.651][ . 7 7 1] [.932] [.786] [.699] [.347] [.924] [.249]











[.110] [.016] [.096] [.031] [.092] [.022] [.087] [.071] [.001] [.008] [.026]
Town size 5 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01











[.030] [.023] [.049] [.019] [.105] [.032] [.031] [.051] [.033] [.052] [.147]
Worker 0.180 . 2 20 . 140 . 2 00 . 130 . 2 40 . 140 . 150 . 160 . 150 . 14
[.392] [.274] [.515] [.332] [.506] [.281] [.472] [.456] [.506] [.488] [.570]
Clerk 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.190 . 3 50 . 2 1 0.21 0.31 0.20 0.31
[.259] [.213] [.351][ . 2 14] [.346] [.126] [.288] [.293] [.212] [.381][ . 2 14]
Specialist 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.160 . 3 30 . 2 1 0.20 0.32 0.180 . 2 8



















c 0.32 0.35 0.27 0.29
[.070] [.074] [.188] [.084] [.248] [.043] [.078] [.127] [.176] [.255] [.264]
Student 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.180 . 190 . 130 . 16 0.22 0.23 0.24




c 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.32 0.41





c 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.28











[.025] [.018] [.028] [.048] [.074] [.014] [.056] [.022] [.025] [.224] [.195]
Gender -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07
[.448] [.282] [.316] [.450] [.277] [.114] [.798] [.501][ . 3 2 8 ][ . 181][ . 3 12]
Correction -0.26 -0.35 -0.37 -0.10- 0 . 3 1 -0.38 0.03 -0.28 -0.86
b -0.13 -0.36
variable [.492] [.321][ . 2 7 7 ][ . 7 15] [.301] [.368] [.937] [.434] [.028] [.635] [.243]
P-values are in parenthesis. 
a ￿ significant on 1% level,  
b ￿ significant on 5% level, 
c ￿ significant on 10% level
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Table 7.
Equation-by-equation estimates






























[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.002] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.003]
Frequency of 0.04 -0.04 0.130 . 0 30.16
b 0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.17 -0.37
a -0.25
c
Visits=1 [.856] [.570] [.211] [.694] [.036] [.565] [.328] [.207] [.573] [.000] [.060]
Frequency of -0 . 10 ---- - 0 . 0 1 -0.13 - -0.08 -0.26
Visits=2 -[ . 3 5 5 ]- - - -[ . 9 15] [.106] - [.753] [.160]
Frequency of ------- 0 . 12 - - -0.28























a -0.04 -0.40 -0.94
a 0.17- 0 . 17 -0.34 -0.47
c -0.64
b



















[.051] [.006] [.019] [.545] [.140] [.003] [.287] [.071] [.118] [.039] [.075]
TV=1 -0.49
b -0.23 -0.24 -0.59
b -0.20 0.12- 0 . 10- 0 . 17- 0 . 12 -0.37 -0.33
[.023] [.228] [.287] [.012] [.385] [.561] [.598] [.447] [.629] [.100] [.161]
TV=2 0.29 0.33 0.13 -0.30 -0.07 0.36 0.190 . 0 6- 0 . 17 -0.03 0.17
[.287] [.158] [.637] [.277] [.803] [.158] [.402] [.811] [.568] [.912] [.552]
TV=3 -0.58
b -0.21 -0.14 -0.68
a 0.06 0.33 -0.15- 0 . 16 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32
[.016] [.336] [.593] [.009] [.820] [.170] [.472] [.512] [.306] [.222] [.226]
TV=4 -0.39
c -0.11 -0.09 -0.50
b -0.03 0.20 0.06 -0.27 0.01 -0.32 -0.20
[.094] [.613] [.701] [.045] [.901] [.367] [.784] [.231][ . 9 7 1][ . 181][ . 4 15]
TV=5 -0.30 -0.23 -0.15- 0 . 4 1 0.01 0.32 0.08 -0.22 -0.10 -0.29 -0.22
[.247] [.328] [.568] [.135] [.957] [.226] [.720] [.386] [.739] [.265] [.427]
Radio=1 0.32 0.26 -0.34 -0.39 -0.16- 0 . 15- 0 . 10 0.28 -0.20 0.23 -0.13
[.252] [.375] [.300] [.254] [.620] [.587] [.691] [.306] [.501] [.448] [.680]
Radio=2 0.130 . 12 -0.28 -0.36 -0.10- 0 . 150 . 160 . 4 0 -0.84
b 0.35 -0.14
[.697] [.729] [.445] [.343] [.784] [.635] [.580] [.218] [.017] [.327] [.689]
Radio=3 0.45 0.10- 0 . 3 1 -0.21 -0.28 -0.05 0.04 0.47 -0.33 0.18 -0.07
[.143] [.755] [.384] [.570] [.407] [.863] [.881][ . 134] [.335] [.588] [.828]
Radio=4 0.36 0.21 -0.48 -0.36 -0.26 -0.15 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.32 -0.12
[.226] [.504] [.166] [.313] [.436] [.604] [.928] [.679] [.855] [.330] [.714]
Radio=5 0.01 0.32 -0.33 -0.47 -0.12 -0.30 -0.21 0.37 -0.26 0.21 -0.01
[.985] [.368] [.384] [.222] [.752] [.378] [.491] [.267] [.477] [.554] [.974]
Friends 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.06
[.903] [.938] [.973] [.341] [.420] [.465] [.854] [.613] [.300] [.982] [.355]
Strangers -0.02 0.00 0.15
c 0.05 0.24
a 0.03 0.11 0.22
a 0.02 -0.11 0.06











































[.054] [.005] [.001] [.154] [.017] [.003] [.002] [.021] [.000] [.071] [.086]












[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.001]
Town size 4 -0.01 0.38
a -0.05 -0.02 -0.130 . 0 2- 0 . 0 1 -0.15
c 0.17 -0.09 -0.18
c
[.951] [.000] [.614] [.840] [.141][ . 8 3 1] [.884] [.082] [.110] [.384] [.084]











[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.002] [.001] [.658] [.000] [.003] [.010]
Peasant -0.07 0.14- 0 . 190 . 3 1 0.23 0.13 -0.42
c -0.43
c -0.190 . 11 -0.14
[.788] [.591][ . 4 7 1][ . 2 2 1][ . 3 6 1] [.634] [.065] [.078] [.511] [.689] [.622]
Worker -0.04 0.34 -0.02 0.32 0.47
b 0.120 . 11 0.05 -0.29 0.25 0.11
[.835] [.114] [.926] [.124] [.019] [.579] [.573] [.803] [.219] [.253] [.654]
Clerk -0.25 0.24 -0.11 0.02 0.15 -0.06 0.08 -0.02 -0.35 0.12 -0.04
[.248] [.275] [.607] [.908] [.455] [.795] [.676] [.940] [.150] [.582] [.858]
Specialist -0.31 0.21 -0.28 0.21 0.180 . 13 -0.20 -0.12 -0.43
c 0.31 -0.01
[.164] [.346] [.209] [.322] [.376] [.563] [.292] [.575] [.078] [.177] [.962]
Businesman -0.07 0.32 0.02 0.36 0.21 -0.01 -0.08 -0.35 -0.31 0.06 -0.07
[.799] [.225] [.932] [.146] [.403] [.967] [.709] [.157] [.272] [.831][ . 8 0 1]
Retired -0.30 0.31 -0.26 0.15 0.30 0.09 -0.06 -0.16- 0 . 3 1 0.10 -0.25
[.191][ . 178] [.256] [.488] [.163] [.703] [.756] [.465] [.219] [.674] [.321]
Student -0.27 0.07 -0.27 0.120 . 2 7- 0 . 11 0.08 -0.31 -0.180 . 0 4- 0 . 0 4
[.256] [.777] [.242] [.581][ . 2 19] [.632] [.693] [.177] [.484] [.885] [.875]
Homemaker -0.28 0.22 -0.09 0.02 0.29 0.21 0.12 0.07 -0.25 0.26 0.03
[.225] [.332] [.700] [.927] [.186] [.373] [.551] [.759] [.345] [.267] [.895]
Unemployed -0.05 0.38
c -0.01 0.32 0.41
b 0.10 -0.06 -0.16 -0.26 0.28 0.07









[.000] [.148] [.001] [.480] [.042] [.828] [.542] [.032] [.001] [.000] [.000]
Gender 0.14
c 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.04
[.052] [.131][ . 5 3 1][ . 9 4 1] [.738] [.908] [.878] [.277] [.751][ . 147] [.557]
Correction 0.40 0.48 -0.17 -0.20 0.30 -0.81
c -0.19 -0.27 0.61 -0.03 -0.34
variable [.288] [.193] [.613] [.467] [.364] [.069] [.569] [.513] [.157] [.928] [.291]
P-values are in parenthesis
a ￿ significant on 1% level
b ￿ significant on 5% level
c ￿ significant on 10% level41











































































Perception 5 [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000]
No fight 2
10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.100 . 11 0.03 0.04 0.100 . 0 3- 0 . 0 1
[.523] [.513] [.553] [.984] [.128] [.277] [.657] [.644] [.356] [.344] [.897]
No fight 3 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07
[.422] [.733] [.758] [.874] [.836] [.683] [.746] [.652] [.825] [.578] [.444]
No fight 4 0.01 -0.07 -0.08
c -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.24
[.892] [.461] [.054] [.532] [.990] [.954] [.408] [.503] [.989] [.548] [.100]
No fight 5 0.06 -0.11 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.13- 0 . 10 -0.06 -0.13
a -0.13
[.573] [.294] [.105] [.487] [.874] [.676] [.144] [.415] [.690] [.000] [.461]
Town size 2 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.15 -0.09 -0.04 -0.26
c 0.01 -0.06
[.986] [.323] [.458] [.733] [.275] [.191] [.407] [.689] [.087] [.853] [.636]
Town size 3 -0.14 -0.34
a -0.23
a -0.16- 0 . 15- 0 . 11 -0.14 -0.05 -0.32
b 0.10- 0 . 0 1
[.174] [.001] [.004] [.121][ . 101] [.328] [.164] [.537] [.033] [.107] [.922]
Town size 4 0.24








[.020] [.783] [.373] [.041] [.010] [.022] [.003] [.010] [.223] [.000] [.010]





c -0.04 0.01 -0.47
a -0.07 -0.11
[.342] [.001] [.000] [.013] [.000] [.099] [.627] [.891] [.002] [.139] [.250]
Peasant 0.73








[.017] [.140] [.565] [.075] [.770] [.061] [.000] [.011] [.039] [.002] [.035]
Worker 0.18 -0.07 -0.46
a 0.10 -0.33 0.26 0.120 . 2 1 0.26 -0.61
a 0.12
[.473] [.758] [.009] [.656] [.143] [.276] [.558] [.281] [.323] [.003] [.659]
Clerk 0.32 0.08 -0.22 0.25 -0.04 0.50
b 0.170 . 2 90.52
c -0.51
b 0.38
[.213] [.719] [.219] [.254] [.854] [.036] [.421][ . 143] [.051] [.013] [.158]
Specialist 0.44





[.089] [.648] [.174] [.369] [.724] [.137] [.070] [.096] [.026] [.034] [.146]
Businessman 0.51






[.070] [.354] [.711][ . 172] [.960] [.037] [.033] [.005] [.018] [1.00] [.010]
Retired 0.48






[.063] [.845] [.855] [.311][ . 5 9 1] [.038] [.046] [.030] [.084] [.043] [.145]
Student 0.37 0.150 . 0 70 . 18- 0 . 120 . 3 1 0.11 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.45
[.162] [.537] [.735] [.440] [.628] [.219] [.645] [.152] [.247] [.205] [.106]
Homemaker 0.35 0.22 -0.22 0.30 -0.06 0.42 0.20 0.29 0.30 -0.26 0.61
b
[.193] [.341][ . 2 5 6 ][ . 187] [.805] [.115] [.378] [.187] [.316] [.235] [.027]
















[.001] [.005] [.000] [.034] [.022] [.058] [.015] [.001] [.001] [.213] [.041]
Gender -0.05 -0.13
c -0.11
b -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
[.501] [.085] [.018] [.401][ . 171] [.388] [.500] [.744] [.500] [.353] [.636]
Correction -0.36 -0.69
b -0.27 -0.15- 0 . 4 1 0.00 0.05 -0.25 -1.18
a -0.31
b -0.28













coefficient [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000]
Number of obs. 1217 14211 365 1395 1488 1170 1139 1162 900 1125 735
P-values are in parenthesis,  
a ￿ significant on 1% level,  
b ￿ significant on 5% level, 
c ￿ significant on 10% level
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[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.004] [.000] [.000] [.006] [.000] [.013]
Frequency of 0.00 0.07 0.18
a 0.12
c 0.10
c 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10
a -0.22
c
Visits=1 [.982] [.195] [.000] [.093] [.050] [.643] [.373] [.740] [.834] [.000] [.099]
Frequency of - 0.21
b - - - - -0.02 -0.09 - 0.31
c -0.22
Visits=2 - [.013] ---- [ . 7 7 2 ] [ . 2 11]-[.081] [.341]
Frequency of ------- 0.18
c -- - 0 . 2 4
Visits=3 ------- [.073] - - [.378]
Press =1 -0.15 -0.59
b -0.53





[.430] [.043] [.000] [.593] [.606] [.013] [.706] [.002] [.100] [.011] [.014]
Press =2 -0.03 -0.24 -0.50





[.905] [.434] [.001] [.657] [.960] [.033] [.483] [.002] [.924] [.091] [.018]
Press =3 -0.16 -0.54
c -0.70





[.445] [.075] [.000] [.884] [.349] [.000] [.345] [.095] [.205] [.001] [.012]
Press =4 -0.30 -0.71
b -0.54






[.140] [.019] [.000] [.625] [.791] [.008] [.813] [.003] [.091] [.028] [.030]
Press =5 -0.11 -0.43 -0.47




[.614] [.155] [.003] [.921][ . 7 13] [.038] [.761] [.011] [.631] [.008] [.288]
TV=1 -0.53
b -0.05 -0.21
c -0.32 0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.34
a -0.39
[.010] [.851] [.092] [.106] [.930] [.547] [.802] [.933] [.844] [.000] [.102]
TV=2 0.07 0.11 0.12 -0.27 -0.09 0.20 0.02 0.06 -0.30 -0.39
a -0.07
[.783] [.700] [.420] [.274] [.640] [.440] [.872] [.806] [.209] [.000] [.815]
TV=3 -0.59
a 0.04 -0.01 -0.42
c 0.160 . 3 1 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.33
a -0.43
[.009] [.881] [.944] [.060] [.398] [.205] [.580] [.609] [.714] [.001] [.122]
TV=4 -0.50
b -0.04 -0.15 -0.38
c 0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.09 0.04 -0.42
a -0.35
[.022] [.877] [.230] [.073] [.940] [.605] [.997] [.684] [.857] [.000] [.185]
TV=5 -0.60
b -0.22 -0.14 -0.38 -0.140 . 16 -0.05 -0.09 -0.35 -0.39
a -0.39
[.010] [.431] [.279] [.101] [.476] [.532] [.727] [.695] [.161] [.000] [.166]
Radio=1 0.44
c 0.150 . 0 6- 0 . 14- 0 . 10 -0.05 0.01 0.43 -0.25 0.48
a 0.16
[.061] [.607] [.752] [.698] [.693] [.852] [.971][ . 121][ . 3 6 1] [.007] [.616]




[.827] [.648] [.322] [.467] [.452] [.572] [.752] [.076] [.006] [.026] [.905]
Radio=3 0.49
c -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.26 0.09 0.11 0.68
b -0.47 0.44
b 0.25
[.059] [.848] [.940] [.890] [.318] [.761][ . 5 0 1] [.030] [.135] [.017] [.488]
Radio=4 0.42
c 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22 -0.11 0.02 0.25 -0.31 0.39
b 0.11
[.094] [.778] [.835] [.936] [.388] [.694] [.899] [.400] [.302] [.028] [.747]
Radio=5 0.160 . 2 4- 0 . 11 -0.18 -0.07 -0.26 0.02 0.42 -0.34 0.25 0.03











[.004] [.002] [.000] [.005] [.060] [.286] [.050] [.166] [.004] [.000] [.045]
Strangers 0.06 0.01 0.12
a 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.08
c 0.11 0.06 -0.11
a 0.07
































Town size 2 0.08 0.22
c 0.18




a 0.100 . 11
[.504] [.054] [.043] [.594] [.273] [.081] [.048] [.091] [.000] [.133] [.389]












[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.016] [.003] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.020] [.001]
Town size 4 -0.06 0.32






[.546] [.001] [.691] [.235] [.020] [.912] [.036] [.297] [.006] [.000] [.025]











[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.004] [.016] [.617] [.000] [.001] [.007]
Peasant 0.03 0.23 0.45
b 0.24 0.26 0.08 -0.46 -0.43 -0.07 -0.08 -0.22




a 0.150 . 170 . 10- 0 . 16 0.76
a 0.16
[.441] [.046] [.001] [.191] [.009] [.546] [.447] [.637] [.619] [.000] [.579]
Clerk -0.100 . 3 20 . 13 0.07 0.27 -0.05 0.21 0.07 -0.22 0.70
a 0.04
[.730] [.220] [.385] [.782] [.238] [.850] [.368] [.765] [.514] [.000] [.901]
Specialist -0.25 0.27 0.120 . 18 0.27 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 -0.42 0.69
a -0.08
[.390] [.295] [.366] [.467] [.242] [.802] [.502] [.819] [.219] [.000] [.795]
Businesman 0.12 0.49
c 0.34
b 0.46 0.33 0.00 -0.06 -0.29 -0.20 0.39
c 0.00
[.702] [.098] [.029] [.113] [.203] [.994] [.803] [.288] [.596] [.052] [.998]
Retired -0.18 0.44 -0.02 0.19 0.40 0.03 -0.02 -0.14 -0.23 0.83
a -0.26
[.545] [.106] [.921] [.443] [.100] [.901][ . 9 2 1] [.574] [.506] [.000] [.396]
Student -0.120 . 12 -0.20 0.03 0.32 -0.06 0.20 -0.35 -0.120 . 0 6- 0 . 0 6
[.683] [.660] [.166] [.902] [.195] [.819] [.420] [.153] [.739] [.741] [.846]
Homemaker -0.14 0.30 0.25 -0.14 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.23 -0.17 0.59
a -0.06





b 0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.13 0.47
a 0.02









[.000] [.145] [.000] [.444] [.043] [.777] [.071] [.004] [.002] [.133] [.000]
Gender 0.16
b 0.08 0.12
a 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.11
b -0.06
[.039] [.322] [.007] [.522] [.446] [.818] [.409] [.224] [.974] [.018] [.442]
Correction 0.22 0.51 0.03 -0.32 0.32 -0.83
c 0.01 -0.54 0.53 0.59
a -0.33
variable [.562] [.206] [.900] [.293] [.316] [.077] [.984] [.269] [.236] [.000] [.343]
P-values are in parenthesis
a ￿ significant on 1% level
b ￿ significant on 5% level
c ￿ significant on 10% level44
 Appendix 1
A1.1 Correction equation specifications
The correction equation relates the availability of the observations for all the variables
present in the main equation to a set of explanatory variables. The biggest lack of
observations in the main equations was due to the missing observations in the corruption
perception variable, the frequency of visits to the institutions (see table 2.) and the willingness
to give bribe variable. Thus, explanatory variables for the correction equation should be
targeted to explain the lack of observations mostly for these three variables.   As the
explanatory variables I use individual characteristics of the respondents such as age, education
and gender. Below I explain why I consider these characteristics to be important.
Arguably, the availability of observations in corruption perception variable depends on
the age of the respondents. Very young and very old people are likely not to have a precise
idea about corruption
11. Young people usually do not care about corruption since they did not
really had a chance to face it, and old people have usually a lot of problems other than
corruption. Their health is getting worse; they have to care for their grandchildren. Old people
are often sclerotic. They might not remember what and where they heard about corruption,
whether they went to certain organizations during the last twelve months before the survey or
not. Old and middle aged people are usually those who still remember the repression of
opinions present under the communist regime, and, thus, they might be afraid to answer the
questions about corruption. I would expect the association between the availability of
observations and age to be bell shaped: both old and very young people seem to have less
                                                
11 In fact it proves that he age squared is significant in only four out of eleven cases in correction equation fro
corruption perception equation, and in only one case in correction equation for willingness to give bribe
equation. Education is much more important factor.45
clear idea about corruption. The simplest way to model the bell shape relationship is to
include both the age and age squared to the correction equation.
 People with higher level of education are likely to think about social issues deeper
than those with lower education. More educated people are likely have clearer idea on
corruption then people with lower education, unless the latter do some kind business where
they have to deal with the officials. It seems necessary to include education to the correction
equation as well.
The availability of answers is likely to depend on the gender of the respondent. It is
usually so that these are women in Ukraine who to take care of children, who keep the house
clean, and who have to solve many practical problems in everyday life. Usually it is women
who take children to the doctors, go to the school meetings, conduct payments for the utilities,
arrange for the flat repairing, cook, clean and shop. Women, thus, are likely to meet
corruption much more often then men and have to have much better formed perception about
corruption in the society and the related issues. In addition they usually have a tendency to
talk a lot to each other conveying rumors, and all the kinds of happenings. Thus, it is the
women who are likely to have more information about corruption, as well as about a lot of
other social things, than men.
Summing up what was said above the availability of the answers to the questions
present in the main equation seems to depend on age (and squared age), education and gender.
Correction equation takes the following form
12:
DWGB = Pr (α10 Const +  α11  A + α12  A
2 + α13 E + α14  X) + e3 (A1-1)
DCP = Pr (α20 Const +  α21  A + α22  A
2 + α23 E + α24  X) + e4 (A1-2)
Where46
Pr ￿ normal probability distribution
Dependent variable (DWGB): dummy equal to 0 if no value is missing in all the variables
present in the Willingness to Give Bribe equation, and 1 if at least one value is missing
Dependent variable (DCP): dummy equal to 0 if no value is missing in all the variables present
in the Willingness to Give Bribe equation, and 1 if at least one value is missing
Independent variables: age (A), age square (A
2), education (E), gender (X).
I estimate correction equation according to probit methodology.
A1.2 Identification of the main equation with correction equation variable
There have been big discussions in the literature on whether it is possible to include all
the explanatory variables that are present in the correction equation to the main equation.  For
example Saha et. al. (1997) and Morffatt, Peters (2000) include all of the variables that are in
the correction equation to the main equation. Identification of the main equation in this case is
assured by the non-linearity of the Mill￿s ratio.
On the other hand, Puhani (2000) argues that in this case the results are rather unrobust
due to collinearity problems. According to him, Mill￿s ratio in its most commonly used part of
it is quasi linear, and, therefore, collinearity problems are likely to prevail. Similarly, Little
and Rubin (1987, p. 230) state that for the Heckman method to work it is necessary that some
variables that are included to the correction equation are not included to the main equation.
In this paper I include education to the correction equation, while it is not present in
the main equation. In the main equation the effect of education is accounted for by inclusion
of age and occupation dummies.
                                                                                                                                                        
12 There are two correction equations of this form: one of them corrects corruption perception equation, the other47
A1.3 Correction equations outcome
Interpretation of the correction equations should take into account the extent to which
the independent variables are able to explain the variation of the dependent one.  If the
explanatory capacity is poor, there is not much sense to speak about the significance of
explanatory variables.
From the first sight the explanatory power of the equations seems to be quite strong.
The percentage of correct predictions varies from 60% to 80% of observations. However
when one considers the percentage of zeroes and ones in the whole sample, one might notice
that the ￿naive￿ explanatory variable, i.e. the variable which would be equal to one if the
percentage of ones in the dependent variable is greater than 50 or zero otherwise, would do
predict well too.  Take, for example, correction equation for the corruption perception
equation for the central government (table 13.). The fraction of correct predictions from a
complicated model of correction equation is 0.70. The fraction of zero observations in the
dependent variable is also 0.70. Thus, if instead of using so many regressors I had just used
one, which would be equal to zero for all the values of dependent variable, I would obtain the
same fit.
So, before describing the results, it is necessary to compare the predictive power of the
used regressors with the predictive power of na￿ve estimates. The detailed description of the
test can be found in the appendix 4. The results of the test are presented in the last two rows of
the tables A1-1 and A1-2 of the current appendix. χ
2 there and p-value are those of the test. In
five out of eleven cases in both correction equations the complicated sets of explanatory
variables did not give better prediction than a na￿ve predictor. Thus, the interpretations below
should be taken with care.
                                                                                                                                                        
￿ willingness to give bribe equation48
 In both correction equations age seems not to be an important determinant of the
availability of observations, while education is. People with full higher education are more
likely to answer the questions in the main equations. This outcome is not surprising. Well-
educated people are usually more thoughtful, and more likely to have an opinion. The
surprising fact is that women are less likely to answer, contrary to what was expected. Women
in Ukraine are usually those who have to care about all the little things of everyday life. These
are usually women who visit school meeting, take children to the doctors, clean the flats,
conduct payments for the utilities, cook and shop. Thus, they are more likely to face everyday
corruption. Moreover, they are thought by the general population to be more prone to convey
rumors and the things that happen in the private life of the others, so they are likely to be
more informed about corruption. However, it seems that either it is not the case, or for some
reason they are less likely to speak about such matters. On the other hand, men usually more
often watch television and read newspapers since they usually have much more time for such
activities. Thus, they really might have clearer perception of corruption and related issues than
women.49
Table A1-1




















c -0.15- 0 . 14 -0.64
b -0.84
a -0.68
b 0.15- 0 . 15 -0.33
[.350] [.010] [.073] [.555] [.585] [.014] [.004] [.017] [.562] [.558] [.200]
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
[.420] [.395] [.540] [.410] [.438] [.786] [.312] [.122] [.856] [.979] [.301]




b 0.00 0.00 0.00
[.197] [.101][ . 138] [.053] [.048] [.217] [.017] [.021] [.563] [.698] [.766]
Education 2 -0.33
c -0.20 -0.28 -0.25 -0.24 -0.19- 0 . 14- 0 . 12- 0 . 13- 0 . 11 -0.14
[.060] [.256] [.108] [.170] [.181][ . 2 7 1][ . 4 14] [.481] [.499] [.548] [.423]
Education 3 -0.44




c -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.18
[.008] [.269] [.110] [.043] [.029] [.067] [.089] [.110] [.109] [.119] [.280]
Education 4 -0.68
a -0.34 -0.13 -0.06 -0.10 -0.26 -0.26 -0.52
b -0.09 -0.43
c -0.36










































































[.001] [.000] [.037] [.008] [.006] [.000] [.016] [.005] [.019] [.003] [.016]
Number of observations 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097
R
2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04
Fraction of Correct
Predictions
0.70 0.77 0.73 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.80 0.81 0.60 0.64 0.60
mean for dep. var. 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.20 0.19 0.60 0.39 0.44
χ
2 2.31







P-value [0.12] [0.18] [0.17] [0.08] 0.73 [0.00] [0.04] [0.62] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
P-values are in parenthesis
a ￿ significant on 1% level
b ￿ significant on 5% level
c ￿ significant on 10% level
Dependent variable is equal to one if at least one of the variables present in the main equation contains missing
observation and zero otherwise.
                                                
13 H0: p12=p21, i.e. probits are not better estimates than naive estimates.50
Table A1-2


























a -0.04 -0.24 -0.31
[.099] [.006] [.025] [.033] [.000] [.006] [.002] [.005] [.877] [.357] [.224]
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[.939] [.620] [.851] [.664] [.866] [.617] [.966] [.588] [.509] [.570] [.228]
Age square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00





c -0.24 -0.23 -0.30
c -0.28 -0.19- 0 . 16 -0.26












[.002] [.072] [.022] [.006] [.038] [.019] [.007] [.009] [.116] [.021] [.056]
Education 4 -0.41
c -0.22 -0.11 -0.27 -0.52
b -0.23 -0.27 -0.38
c -0.04 -0.34 -0.32













































































[.000] [.000] [.013] [.001] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.133] [.001] [.017]
Number of observations 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097
R
2 0.046 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.05
Fraction of Correct
Predictions
0.70 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.78 0.76 0.57 0.64 0.60
Mean of dep. var. 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.22 0.25 0.49 0.39 0.44
χ
2 3.31
c 0.29 1.38 8.68
a 0.62 13.56




P-value [0.07] [0.58] [0.23] [0.00] [0.42] [0.00] [0.11][ 0 . 2 1] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
P-values are in parenthesis
a ￿ significant on 1% level
b ￿ significant on 5% level
c ￿ significant on 10% level
Dependent variable is equal to one if at least one of the variables present in the main equation contains missing
observation and zero otherwise.51
Appendix 2
A2.1 Method of estimation
Since the data are mostly of categorical nature the linear regressions might not be the best
choice. The most widely used approach in this case is to use logit or probit estimations. Both
of the techniques usually provide similar results, but I prefer to use probit it will allow me
better comparison of the equation-by-equation estimates with the simultaneous equations
estimates (it is very difficult to run simultaneous ordered logits since bivariate probability
distribution approximation function is difficult to obtain). Probit approach models the
probability of the categorical variable falling into a certain category using normal distribution,
which is easier to approximate for the bivariate case.
A2.2 Some technical details of joint probits programming and estimation
Let Y1 and Y2 be the dependent variables for the equations one and two
Let Q1 be unobserved variable equal to
 Q1  = X1B1 + U1    (A2-1)
where
 X1 is the vector of independent variables in the equation one
B1 is the vector of coefficients in the equation one
U1 is the vector of disturbances in equation one
and52
 Y1 = 1 for      Q1 ≤  0         (                      U1 ≤      - X1B1   )  (A2-2)
      2 for   0  < Q1 ≤ A1      (       - X1B1  < U1 ≤  A1 - X1B1  ) (A2-3)
      3 for A1 < Q1 ≤ A2       (  A1 - X1B1  < U1 ≤  A2 - X1B1  ) (A2-4)
      4 for A2 < Q1 ≤ A3       (  A2 - X1B1  < U1 ≤  A3 - X1B1  ) (A2-5)
      5 for A3 < Q1               (  A3 - X1B1  < U1                      )  (A2-6)
Let Q2 be unobserved variable such that
 Q2  = X2B2 + U2    (A2-7)
where X2 is the vector of independent variables in the equation two
B2 is the vector of coefficients in the equation two
U2 is the vector of disturbances in equation two
and
 Y2 = 1 for      Q2 ≤  0         (                        U2   ≤      - X2B2  )  (A2-8)
      2 for 0    < Q2 ≤  C1       (       - X2B2  < U2 ≤  C1 - X2B2  ) (A2-9)
      3 for C1 < Q2 ≤  C2       (  C1 - X2B2  < U2 ≤  C2 - X2B2  )  (A2-10)
      4 for C2 < Q2 ≤  C3       (  C2 - X2B2  < U2 ≤  C3 - X2B2  )  (A2-11)
      5 for C3 < Q2                 (  C3 - X2B2  < U2                         )  (A2-12)
I use the approximation for the bivariate cumulative normal distribution from the book of
Abramovitz and Stegun, (Handbook of Mathematical Functions, formula 26.3.29).





2 - 1)/6 ); (A2-13)
where cnorm is cumulative normal distribution
norm is normal density function
For this approximation in the Taylor expansions for small correlation coefficient (ρ), the
average absolute error for ρ =0.9 is 0.00887, and it is much smaller for smaller ρ.
I construct the likelihood function and conduct maximization. For the starting values I use the
outcomes of the equation-by-equation estimates. For the correlation coefficient ρ I tried all
possible starting values from 0.9 to ￿0.9 with step 0.1.54
Appendix 3
The detailed description of the survey questions, which served as a basis for the
variables used in the papers
The following appendix provide the description of the variables used relating them to
the actual questions of the questionnaire. I start each section with the original question of the
questionnaire that relates to the variable I use. In the footnote I provide the original Ukrainian
wording of the question. Then I describe possible answers from which the respondents had to
choose and state the type of the variable that comes out.
A3.1 Corruption perception
To what extend is corruption spread in the following organizations (for the list of the
organizations see the table 2)?
14  The answer to this question represents corruption perception
of the respondent in the corresponding institution. Thus, I call this variable ￿corruption
perception￿. This is categorical variable that varies from one to five according to the
following scheme
I.  an institution is not corrupt at all
II.  it is more likely that it is not corrupt than corrupt
III.  one can face corruptness of officials in approximately as many cases as non-
corruptness
IV.  an institution is likely to be corrupt
V.  an institution is heavily corrupt.55
A3.2 Frequency of visits to the organizations
How many times did you visit the organizations (see the table 2.) during the twelve months
before the survey?
15 The answers to this question provide me with frequency of visits
variable, which is categorical and varies from one to four.  The categories are:
1 ￿ never visited,
2 ￿ visited one or two times,
3 ￿ visited more than two but less then 10 times,
4 ￿ visited more than ten times.
A3.3 Sources of information about corruption the respondents used
From which sources did you get the information about corruption during the last twelve
months?
16 Suggested sources are press, TV, radio, friends, strangers, and personal experience.
A3.4 Trust to the mass media variable
Do you think that the information in the mass media about corruption truthful?
17 This is
categorical variable ranging from one to five. One corresponds to the answer that the
information is very truthful, two ￿ rather truthful, three ￿ sometimes truthful sometimes not,
four - rather untruthful, five - totally untruthful
                                                                                                                                                        
14 The original wording in Ukrainian: Як Ви вважаєте, якою мірою хабарництво, продажність поширені
серед посадових осіб в органах та організаціях, які я називатиму?
15 The original wording in Ukrainian: Зараз я називатиму органи та організації, а Ви, будь ласка, скажіть,
користуючись карткою, скільки приблизно разів за останній рік (останні 12 місяців) Ви ЗВЕРТАЛИСЯ
до кожного з них.
16 З яких джерел Ви отримували відомості про хабарництво, продажність посадових осіб впродовж
останнього року (останніх 12 місяців)?56
A3.5 Perceived willingness of the government to fight corruption
  Do you agree that the government does not do anything to fight corruption?
18 This is
categorical variable that varies from one to five  (1 - agree, 5 - disagree)
  A3.6 Perceived willingness of the population to give bribes
 
Do you agree that in order to solve the matter with the public official it is not necessary to
give a bribe?
19 This is categorical variable that varies from one to five  (1 - agree, 5 -
disagree)
There are also some occupation and town size variables. The wordings of questions for them
are quite obvious, so I do not describe them in this section. For a brief look at the variables
used in the econometric analysis see table 3.
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Як Ви вважаєте, наскільки є достовірною інформація про хабарництво, продажність посадових осіб,
яка з￿являється на радіо, телебаченні, в пресі?
18 А зараз я зачитаю Вам кілька тверджень, а Ви, будь ласка, скажіть про кожне з них якою мірою Ви
погоджуєтесь або не погоджуєтесь з ним: Влада не вживає ніяких заходів для боротьби з хабарництвом
19 А зараз я зачитаю Вам кілька тверджень, а Ви, будь ласка, скажіть про кожне з них якою мірою Ви
погоджуєтесь або не погоджуєтесь з ним:
Для успішного вирішення питань з  посадовими особами зовсім необов￿язково давати хабаря57
Appendix 4
Testing the significance of prediction accuracy in discrete choice models
The test was suggested by Jaromir Antoch and Jan Hanousek in their paper ￿A
specification test for discrete choice models￿. The idea is to compare the prediction accuracy
of the model in question and a na￿ve predictor.A na￿ve predictor is a predictor equal to one for
all the values of dependent variable if the number of ones in the dependent variable is more
than 50% of the sample and zero otherwise.
Let n1 be the number of observations which method one predicts correctly and method
two predicts incorrectly. Let n2 be the number of observations which method one predicts
incorrectly and method two predicts correctly. Then the following statistics has χ
2 distribution




The actual values for this statistics are presented in appendix 1 in the last but one row of
the tables A1-1 and A1-2. The last row contains he P-values.